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Research on the relationship between nationhood and individual attitudes prominently focuses 
on whether — and how — the distinction between ethnic and civic conceptions may be drawn 
in mass public opinion. We depart from this literature to explain the effects of party rhetoric on 
shaping more restrictive conceptions of nationhood, which previous research refers to as 
“ethnic”, “objective”, or “ascriptive” views on nationhood. We do so in three parts: we examine 
whether political rhetoric, in terms of party manifestos, and individual-level conceptions of 
nationhood are linked; whether the relationship depends on the ideological alignment between 
political parties and respondents; and whether political rhetoric and individual predisposition 
act in combination. We analyze three waves of survey data from the International Social Survey 
Programme’s National Identity module from 1995, 2003 and 2013, covering 58,498 
respondents from 39 countries. We find that political rhetoric influences respondents’ 
conceptions of nationhood. This effect, however, is not as straightforward as initially expected. 
While the overall political climate does not have a direct effect at the societal level, it does 
affect the way in which a specific party’s political messages influence the attitudes of their 
individual recipients. Once the political climate is more ethnocentric, conceptions of 
nationhood tend to be more restrictive across the board, even among respondents aligned with 
parties that do not emphasize ethnic conceptions.  




Nations are social constructs or, in the words of Anderson (1983), “imagined communities.” However, 
nations are imagined in different ways. Some are seen as sharply delineated in relation to other nations, 
such that individuals may not easily cross the national boundary and be accepted by others as fellow 
members of the nation. Boundaries of other nations may be more permeable, such that boundary crossing 
is more easily achieved (Lamont and Molnar, 2002; Wimmer, 2008). The literature often distinguishes 
between two ideal-typical conceptions of nationhood: ethnic and civic (Brubaker, 1992; Kohn, 1944; but 
see Brubaker, 1999; Kuzio, 2002). Ethnic citizenship implies that ancestry determines who is accepted as 
a full member of the nation. Civic citizenship, in contrast, implies inclusiveness, as membership is not 
linked to ascriptive but to voluntarist attributes, such as adherence to legal norms.  
Following these theoretical considerations, research on how nationhood is thought of by individuals 
prominently focuses on whether — and how — the distinction between ethnic and civic citizenship is 
reflected in mass public opinion. Some studies find two broad types of normative conceptions that parallel 
the ethnic–civic distinction (e.g. Jones and Smith, 2001a; Kunovich, 2009; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010). 
Other studies, however, cannot identify any evidence for a dichotomy and find the ethnic–civic distinction 
to be invalid (e.g. Diez-Medrano, 2005; Haller and Ressler, 2006). This discrepancy in findings is partly due 
to conceptual ambiguities, as there is no consensus on which indicators signal an ethnic conception and 
which signal a civic one (see also Jayet, 2012). Moreover, ethnic and civic conceptions are often theorized 
to be mutually exclusive, even though they are shown to overlap or even to be mutually reinforcing (e.g. 
Diez-Medrano, 2005; Jayet, 2012; Wright et al., 2012).  
While the present paper also examines how the concept of nationhood is reflected in individual attitudes, 
it departs from this literature on such typologies of nationhood and citizenship in mass public opinion. 
Rather, we aim to explain the relationship between the rhetoric surrounding nationhood advanced by 
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specific political parties as well as the political climate at the societal level and how the nation is imagined 
by individuals: do they see it in inclusive, civic terms, open to newcomers as long as they respect legal 
norms and want to belong? Or do they imagine the nation in more exclusive terms, only encompassing 
those long rooted in the country? Our dependent variable focuses on the latter, that is, on the extent to 
which individuals hold a more restrictive definition of who belongs to the nation. As we will describe in 
the methods section, we derive the concept of preference for restrictive nationhood inductively from the 
available survey data. Here suffice it to say that it describes the extent to which individuals think it is 
important to have been born in the country, to having lived there for most of one’s life and to belonging 
to the country’s dominant religion.1 
The relationship between political climate and rhetoric and conceptions of nationhood has recently come 
into focus as political parties with explicitly exclusive rhetoric gained electoral ground over the last decade 
in countries such as Austria, Germany, France, Hungary, Poland and the United States. As the terms 
political climate and rhetoric can be used differently, we need to define them at this point: “Rhetoric”, in 
our case, refers to the party’s positions as expressed in pre-election manifestos. This rhetoric, then, 
informs two different concepts: “Political climate” – the aggregated sum of party positions in a given 
society, and “preferred party’s rhetoric” – the position of the respondents’ preferred party. Thus, when 
using the term “rhetoric” we consider both concepts, while we use political climate or preferred party 
rhetoric when referring only to a single concept. 
We find that political rhetoric influences respondents’ conceptions of nationhood. This effect, however, 
is not as straightforward as initially expected. While political climate does not have a direct effect, it alters 
the way in which a specific party’s political messages affect the attitudes of their individual recipients. 
Parties with stronger ethnic rhetoric have a larger effect on party followers in societies that are 
characterized by a political climate generally low in ethnic rhetoric, as a single party position matters more 
when most other parties call for the opposite. Conversely, however, if the overall political climate is more 
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ethnocentric, conceptions of nationhood tend to be more restrictive across the board, even among 
respondents aligned with parties that do not emphasize ethnic conceptions.  
Our study improves existing research in various ways. We go beyond previous studies by examining more 
closely the role of political rhetoric in explaining normative conceptions of nationhood at the individual 
level. We also emphasize the importance of considering not only political rhetoric as such but also its 
interaction with individual-level factors. In terms of research methods, we employ a novel cross-sectional 
and time-series design, which goes beyond the simple cross-sectional design of studies such as Helbling 
et al. (2016). Yet, we are aware of the causality problem: rather than political rhetoric affecting individuals’ 
conception of nationhood, it may well be that parties respond to changing conceptions among voters and 
adapt their program accordingly; or that factors that are not yet accounted for affect both parties and 
individuals equally. While we are not able to resolve this problem in the present paper, we use a setup 
that aligns with the idea of rhetoric influencing public opinion by considering the party positions of the 
election before our survey data was collected in each of the three waves. 
The following first provides a theoretical background on the conceptions of nationhood and the factors 
that contribute to such conceptions in the minds of citizens. It then outlines the importance of political 
rhetoric, the importance of who the sender is and the interaction of societal and individual-level 
conceptions of nationhood. We test the hypotheses using several multi-level models. The conclusion 
discusses alternative explanations and the implications of our findings.  
Theoretical background 
Various studies on mass public opinion examine how different normative conceptions of nationhood may 
be explained. At the individual level, older, less educated, economically worse off and politically right-
wing respondents are found to exhibit more restrictive conceptions of nationhood. This is often thought 
to result from their increased perceptions of both economic and cultural threat from outsiders (Citrin and 
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Sides, 2008; Schildkraut, 2007; Wright, 2011a). Similarly, macro-level factors such as lower levels of 
economic prosperity or higher levels of immigration are linked to more restrictive conceptions of 
nationhood, as these also increase perceptions of threat in society (Jones and Smith, 2001a; Kunovich, 
2009; Wright, 2011a).2  
The analysis of macro-political predictors of normative conceptions of national identity, however, is 
limited. Some studies examine the effect of multiculturalist policies in citizenship regimes (Weldon, 2006; 
Wright, 2011b), and argue that citizenship regimes influence the way individual citizens perceive the social 
boundaries of their nation by emphasizing and institutionalizing such social boundaries. Restrictive 
institutional environments encourage citizens to view ethnic diversity as a problem and hence to hold a 
more restrictive definition of their nation. More open institutional environments, on the other hand, may 
make civic citizenship more acceptable (Zamora-Kapoor et al., 2013).  
However, the same argument may be made with regard to shorter-term political factors such as elite 
rhetoric. Political actors may increase the salience of ethnic or civic conceptions of nationhood by, for 
example, emphasizing either traditions and ancestry or ideas of equality and respect for norms and values 
(Helbling et al., 2016; Wimmer, 2008). Thus, political rhetoric may serve a priming role by increasing the 
cognitive accessibility of different conceptions of nationhood (e.g. Valentino et al., 2002) and hence 
affects what is perceived to be common knowledge. Few studies examine the effect of political rhetoric 
on conceptions of national boundaries directly, but we may find some indications for the validity of the 
hypothesis in research on phenomena related to national identity more generally, such as nationalist 
sentiments, attitudes towards immigrants or general social trust. The evidence is ambiguous. Some 
studies do not find evidence for a link between rhetoric and attitudes and suggest it may be wrong to 
overestimate the “constructionist power” of political elite rhetoric (Boonen and Hooghe, 2014: 56; see 
also Dunn and Singh, 2011; Hjerm and Schnabel, 2010). Others, in contrast, find that party rhetoric has a 
deteriorating effect on ethnic relations, and not only when the rhetoric is negative (Sprague-Jones, 2011): 
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the mere mention of ethnic diversity suffices, as it increases the salience of differences in society (Helbling 
et al., 2013; Hopkins, 2010). 
Building on studies that examine the role of political rhetoric in shaping national relations across 
boundaries, we seek to determine the effect of political rhetoric on the conception of such boundaries. 
First, we examine whether rhetoric and such conceptions are linked. Working as a primer, political rhetoric 
may affect normative conceptions in three ways (Bohmann, 2011): it may reinforce or mitigate symbolic 
boundaries arising from longer-standing institutional frameworks or exogenous processes such as 
economic prosperity; it may increase the visibility of diversity; and it may bring more restrictive definitions 
of national membership into the sphere of acceptance. That is, we expect that individuals in countries 
with higher levels of ethnic political climates tend to define nationhood in more restrictive terms, whereas 
the opposite should be the case in societies with civic political climates. 
Second, we examine whether this relationship holds across the board or depends on the alignment 
between the ideological position of the party sending the message and that of the receiver. According to 
the literature on elite cues (Lupia, 1994; Zaller, 1992), individuals specifically consider the information 
provided by trusted elites when forming their political opinions. With regard to anti-immigrant attitudes, 
previous studies show that individuals are more likely to share the views of their favored party (Bohmann, 
2011; McLaren, 2001). Accordingly, we hypothesize that respondents tend to be more restrictive in their 
conceptions of nationhood if they prefer a party that supports an ethnic conception of nationhood, and 
less restrictive if they prefer a party that supports a civic conception. 
Third, we examine whether conceptions of nationhood at the societal level interact with ideological 
predispositions of respondents in explaining their view of the nation. With regard to anti-immigrant 
attitudes, Semyonov et al. (2006) argue that ideological differences between people become more 
pronounced in right-wing political climates. In contrast, both Sniderman et al. (2004) and van Assche et 
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al. (2016) observe a mobilizing effect across the board; that is, the effect of respondents’ own ideological 
positions is weaker in right-wing political climates than in more liberal climates. The political climate 
influences social norms such that individual deviations from the norms are less pronounced. Accordingly, 
we expect that in political climates that are generally low in ethnic rhetoric, only people who support 
parties that do express ethnic rhetoric prefer more restrictive membership criteria, while in political 
climates in which ethnic rhetoric is common, almost all individuals (also those who support parties with 
civic rhetoric) may show more restrictive attitudes due to conservative norm setting. The opposite should 
hold in countries with low and high civic rhetoric, respectively. 
Alternative views 
As mentioned in the beginning of the previous section, several strands of theory consider determinants 
of subjective conceptualizations of nationhood and related topics that need to be considered as controls. 
First, studies on normative conceptions of national symbolic boundaries as well as related phenomena, 
such as attitudes towards immigrants, are strongly influenced by theories of group threat (Ceobanu and 
Escandell, 2010; Kunovich, 2009; Wright, 2011a). Overall, these approaches suggest that more 
immigration leads to stronger ethnocentric conceptions of the national community, specifically among 
members of the in-group who are vulnerable to out-group competition, such as the less educated or 
unemployed. Alternatively, contact theory (Gundelach, 2014) argues that everyday encounters with out-
group members may result in a learning process about the out-group and hence decrease, rather than 
increase, prejudice (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998). Further, at the societal level, threat may be mediated 
through higher levels of development (Jones and Smith, 2001b; Kunovich, 2009).  
Second, the general political context may influence the way individual citizens perceive the social 
boundaries of their nation. Restrictive institutional environments encourage citizens to view ethnic and 
cultural diversity as a problem, whereas more open institutional environments may make civic nationhood 
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more acceptable (Zamora-Kapoor et al., 2013). In the long run, as pointed out with regard to political 
tolerance and the positive effects of observing democratic bargaining processes (Peffley and 
Rohrschneider, 2003), such exposure can result in learning effects and attitudinal change. Yet, the legacy 
of previous political systems may still influence current attitudes, given that research shows clear 
differences between Western and post-communist countries in Europe as far as the conceptualization of 
nationhood is concerned (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Haller and Ressler, 2006; Shulman, 2002). 
Third, influences can also come from the international environment. World-society theory asserts that 
global cultural models influence local actors and shape their perceptions and attitudes (Hafner-Burton 
and Tsutsui, 2005; Meyer et al., 1997). A core element of this international regime is human rights and 
citizenship rights (Meyer, 2007; Tsutsui and Wotipka, 2004), with a historical trajectory of increasingly 
extending membership rights to individuals beyond traditional national groups. Thus, a more inclusive 
definition of citizenship has become the dominant global cultural model (Ramirez and Meyer, 2012), 
resulting in a diminished differentiation between citizens and non-citizens (Soysal, 1994).  
Data and Methods 
The empirical analysis is based on public opinion data collected by the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) in 1995, 2003 and 2013 (ISSP Research Group, 1998; 2012; 2015). The surveys are 
random samples and representative of the adult population of each country. We limited our sample to 
countries for which political rhetoric data was available for an election before the fieldwork, and to 
respondents who reported their party affiliation. Furthermore, East and West Germany were considered 
separately, as we wanted to test a hypothesis regarding the influence of a communist past on the 
conception of nationhood.3 This selection resulted in a total of 39 countries, 77 wave/country time points 
and a sample size of 58,498 respondents (see Table 1a for an overview). Due to the diverse nature of the 
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countries, we also re-ran our final models using EU-member countries only. The findings (available upon 
request) were quite similar; thus, we decided to use the full set of countries to maximize statistical power.  
Dependent variable 
We derived the dependent variable from a question battery originally developed by the ISSP group to 
distinguish between “ethnic” and “civic” traits of nationhood. Respondents were asked the following: 
“Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they 
are not important. How important do you think each of the following is ...” The items that the respondents 
could select were as follows: a) to have been born in [country]; b) to have the [country] citizenship; c) to 
have lived in [country] for most of one’s life; d) to be able to speak the [country] language; e) to be 
[religion]; f) to respect the [country’s] political institutions and laws and g) to feel [country nationality]. 
The terms in [parenthesis] were replaced by the respective country names and, in case of e, its dominant 
religion. For each item, respondents were asked if they consider that item very important, fairly 
important, not very important or not important at all. 
This question battery has been used extensively in research to identify dimensions in the perception of 
nationhood among the public. The consensus among researchers is that these items are imperfect 
measures of an ethnic versus civic dichotomy, with some researchers even doubting the existence of a 
two dimensionality (Haller and Ressler, 2006). To complicate things further, those researchers identifying 
two dimensions use a different terminology to describe the same dimensions, such as “ethnic” versus a 
“civic” dimension (Helbling et al., 2016) or an “ascribed/objective” versus a “civic/voluntarist” dimension 
(Jones and Smith, 2001a). 
Given that we are considering more waves and more countries than previous research, we decided to 
ascertain the comparability of our dependent variable across countries and time by conducting 
explanatory and confirmatory factor analyses for the entire sample and for each country/wave 
10 
observation. The exploratory examination of the factor structure indicated that only the items “to be born 
in the country,” “having lived there for most of one’s life” and “belonging to a particular religion” load 
consistently on the same dimension. Subsequent confirmatory factor analyses for each country/wave 
observation confirmed this single factor (CFI > .90, RMSEA < .05). While the loading of the other items is 
less consistent across countries and supports the view that there is no consistent two-dimensional 
solution (Haller and Ressler, 2006), our single factor composed of three core items is comparable across 
countries and waves.  
These three consistent items – “to be born in the country,” “having lived there for most of one’s life” and 
“belonging to a particular religion” – are also part of the ethnic dimension (Helbling et al., 2016) and the 
ascribed/objective dimension (Jones and Smith, 2001a) described in other research. Objections may be 
had against either of these terms as, for example, both living in a country or belonging to a religion may 
be, to some degree, the result of personal choice rather than “ethnic” or “ascribed”. Yet all three items 
describe characteristics that are not easily obtained by outsiders; access to nationhood is hence restricted. 
We thus decided to name our dependent variable “preference for restrictive nationhood” and calculated 
the mean value of a respondent’s valid answers across these three items.4 
Measurement of political rhetoric 
To measure political rhetoric, we used data on political party manifestos collected by the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (CMP, Volkens et al., 2015). The CMP routinely conducts content analyses of parties’ 
electoral programs across many post-World War II elections in most Western democracies and is hence 
well suited for the comparative analysis of party positions. Party manifesto content are shown to 
approximate politicians’ statements in public, and public opinion data on party positions aligns more 
closely with manifesto content than, for example, with media coverage (Helbling and Tresch, 2011). Thus, 
manifesto content may act as a suitable proxy measurement for party rhetoric more generally.  
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The CMP codes manifestos’ quasi-sentences for 56 different issue domains and provides the share of 
space devoted to each issue domain as a measure of their salience. A number of these domains may be 
used to operationalize the salience of issues concerning national identity in elite-level rhetoric (see also 
e.g. Alonso and da Fonseca, 2012; Helbling et al., 2016; Hjerm and Schnabel, 2010). To measure a more 
restrictive ethnic rhetoric regarding nationhood, we combined “favourable mentions of the manifesto 
country’s nation, history, and general appeals” (national way of life: positive, 601) and “favourable 
mentions of traditional and/or religious moral values” (traditional morality: positive, 603) with negative 
references to multiculturalism (608), defined as “the enforcement or encouragement of cultural 
integration” and “appeals for cultural homogeneity in society.” To measure a more inclusive civic rhetoric, 
we combine the shares of manifestos’ positive references to equality (category 503), defined as “concept 
of social justice and the need for fair treatment of all people”; civic mindedness (606), that is, “appeals for 
national solidarity and the need for society to see itself as united”; and multiculturalism (607), referring 
to “favourable mentions of cultural diversity and cultural plurality within domestic societies.” While the 
latter domain includes mention of culture as well, it does so in a positive light that does not express a 
preference for the majority culture and is hence contrary to what is expressed in ethnic rhetoric.5  
We include these measures of political rhetoric in our models in two ways. First, for the political climate 
at the societal level, we calculated the average salience of both civic and ethnic rhetoric per country (the 
average score across all parties in a given country) for the respective elections before or in 1995, 2003 
and 2013.6 The political climate is thus reflected in two macro-level variables: “societal civic climate” and 
“societal ethnic climate.”  
Second, to distinguish specific party messages from the overall political climate in a society, we also 
included ethnic and civic rhetoric at the individual level, replacing the respondents’ recorded party 
preference with the rhetoric scores of this specific party. The resulting two individual-level variables are 
“preferred party’s civic rhetoric” and “preferred party’s ethnic rhetoric.” 
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Control variables 
We tested our hypotheses with the variables described in the previous section. As pointed out in the 
alternative views section, we also needed to control for additional variables. Following prior studies on 
determinants of normative conceptions of nationhood, we included several indicators that are associated 
with economic or cultural threat, characteristics of the political system and the international ties of a 
country. At the individual level, these include work status, income, education, age, residence, political 
ideology and minority status. We captured economic insecurity with work status, which was categorized 
into working for pay, unemployed, disabled, in training or mandatory services, retired, housemaker and 
other. For income, we used household income, as it was reported by more respondents than personal 
income. Because income was collected in the different national currencies, we standardized it by dividing 
the reported income by the national mean. Further, we used the logarithm of this measure so that a value 
of zero stood for an average income, negative values for an income below the national average and 
positive values for an income above average.  
Education was measured by the number of years spent in the educational system; age was measured in 
years; and residence was captured by the three categories: large city, smaller city and rural area. Gender 
was captured as a categorical variable, with female being coded as 1, and male being coded as 0. The 
respondent’s political ideology was measured by the ISSP 5-point left–right scale. This left–right scale was 
based on the ISSP data and thus independent from the CMP left–right classification, which arose from the 
manifesto coding and was assigned to respondents. The correlation between the ISSP left–right scale and 
civic rhetoric was -0.29, and that between the left–right scale and ethnic rhetoric was 0.42 (and -0.05 
between civic and ethnic), which shows that rhetoric does not map perfectly on the left–right scale and 
thus allows us to use all three variables in a single regression. Finally, because members of ethnic or 
religious minorities are likely less inclined to prefer restrictive conceptions of nationhood, we control for 
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the respondent’s status as a member of an ethnic or religious minority as well as their migration 
background, as indicated by their parents’ citizenship status. 
At the country level, we controlled for the level of prosperity and the size of the immigrant population. 
National prosperity was captured by GDP (in 1,000 Euros), which was drawn from the World Bank (2016). 
Immigration numbers were based on UN collected data at the time or shortly before the ISSP surveys were 
conducted (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015). We measured immigration 
levels as the proportion of immigrants in each country’s population. We also controlled for three further 
macro-political factors that may affect conceptions of nationhood. First, given different conceptions of 
nationhood in post-communist countries, we included a post-communism dummy in our models. Second, 
we measured multicultural policies with the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP) developed by Banting 
and Kymlicka (2013). We chose MCP over other indices because, while it focuses on multiculturalist policy, 
the indicators address some of the same concepts as conceptions of nationhood. Finally, we also 
considered a country’s ties to world society, which were measured by “the number of organizations of 
which a country or territory is a member, whether directly or through the presence of members in that 
country” (Union of International Associations, 2014: 45).7 In particular, we included the number of 
International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs), taken from the Yearbook of International 
Organizations (Union of International Associations, various years).  
Analysis strategy 
Our research design aimed to capture several aspects: variation across countries, changes over time and 
individual-level influences. The ISSP data is well suited for this purpose; however, there was a concern 
that countries took part in different numbers of waves — either in one, in two or in all three waves — and 
that respondents varied between samples. Such an unbalanced design can be analyzed using multilevel 
models in which cross-country variance is calculated based on all available countries in a given wave and 
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over-time variation is calculated based on countries that are available for at least two waves (Deeming 
and Jones, 2015; see Fairbrother, 2014).  
This design allows for distinguishing the cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of a variable such as 
societal wealth. In terms of model set-up, level three included country-invariant characteristics, such as 
post-communist status; level two included country characteristics that change over time, such as the 
number of immigrants at a given wave; and level one included respondents’ answers. For this purpose, 
we included a macro-level variable’s mean value across all three waves for each country as the level-three 
variable and the growth variable (macro-level variable at a given wave minus the country average across 
all three waves) at level two. 
Results 
Restrictive conceptions of nationhood: Magnitude and trends over time 
Table 1a provides an overview of the average preferences for more restrictive nationhood in all countries 
and time-points considered in our analyses. The scores are based on the answers to the items to be born 
in the country, to have lived there most of one’s life and to belong to a particular religion. The values can 
range from 1 to 4, with the former indicating “not important at all” and the latter indicating “very 
important.” A higher value thus represents a stronger preference for restrictive nationhood. Countries are 
sorted from high to low, according to the latest data available. Preferences for restrictive conceptions of 
nationhood are very strong in South Africa, Turkey and Russia and comparably weak in Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Estonia.  
< About here TABLE 1a and TABLE 1b > 
Table 1b, in addition, shows the changes in nationhood conceptions over time for those countries that 
took part in at least two waves. Change is based on the difference between the latest and the earliest 
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data available. With an almost even split between increase and decrease, these numbers do not indicate 
any dominant pattern of change. However, post-communist countries can be found predominantly in the 
group of countries with an increasing preference for more restrictive conceptions, which points to 
possible influences of the political history but also to differences due to societal affluence. However, this 
interpretation is based only on descriptive findings and aggregate values. The next section presents 
multilevel results that consider both the influence of individual-level and contextual characteristics on 
individual conceptualizations of nationhood. 
 
Determinants of preferences for restrictive conceptions of nationhood: Multilevel analysis 
Table 2 shows the results of four multilevel regressions that follow a specific research logic. Model 1 shows 
a basic model that includes the two political climate variables: for each, a variable capturing the time 
effect and a variable capturing the interaction between climate and time. Model 2 adds the individual 
reception of specific party rhetoric by including the positions of the respondent’s preferred party. Model 
3 in addition includes interactions between the individual reception and the overall political climate in a 
society. Model 4, finally, tests if the effects of these substantive variables remain significant once controls 
are included.  
< About here TABLE 2 > 
Model 1, considering macro-level variables only, does not indicate significant main effects of the two 
political climate variables. The civic dimension, however, interacts significantly with the time variable (see 
Figure 1, which depicts this relationship for a later model). Preferences for restrictive conceptions of 
nationhood thus increase significantly over time in societies with a low civic political climate, whereas 
such preferences decline over time in societies with a strong civic climate. The changes over time are thus 
dependent on the overall political climate. 
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Model 2 shows that the position of the preferred party matters as well: the stronger the civic position of 
the preferred party, the lower respondents’ preference for restrictive conceptions of nationhood, and the 
stronger the ethnic position of the preferred party, the stronger this preference. We thus can add that 
party-specific rhetoric matters in addition to the overall political climate and that individual preferences 
for nationhood criteria align with those articulated by their preferred party. 
Model 1 and Model 2 ignore that the effects of specific party positions and their reception can be 
influenced by the overall political climate. Model 3 thus connects the positions of the preferred party with 
the overall political climate by adding cross-level interactions. These interactions show that i) civic rhetoric 
of the preferred party has a stronger effect in societies with a low civic political climate; ii) civic party 
rhetoric is more effective when the overall climate is ethnocentric; and iii) ethnic party rhetoric is less 
effective in societies with an overall strong ethnic political climate in affecting preference for restrictive 
nationhood. Further, the interaction between civic political climate and change over time is still 
significant, as depicted in Figure 1, yet controlling for individual characteristics in the subsequent model 
renders this effect insignificant. 
Model 4 controls these findings for various context and individual variables. It shows that the interaction 
between societal civic political climate and the civic rhetoric of the preferred party as well as the 
interaction between time and societal civic political climate lose their significance, whereas the other 
effects remain more or less unchanged.8 The interaction between societal ethnic political climate and the 
ethnic rhetoric of the preferred party is still significant, as depicted in Figure 2. The figure shows that a 
party’s extent of ethnic rhetoric is more strongly associated with preferences for restrictive nationhood 
in countries with generally low levels of ethnic political climate: the differences between respondents with 
different party preferences are larger than those in countries with overall higher levels of ethnic political 
climate. In countries with strong ethnic climates, preferences for restrictive nationhood are high across 
the board, even among respondents who prefer parties with civic rhetoric.  
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< About here FIGURE 1 and FIGURE 2 > 
As for the macro-level controls, Model 4 shows that the preference for restrictive nationhood is less 
pronounced in more affluent societies and in societies with a communist legacy. The indicators for ties to 
world society and for multicultural policies, however, become insignificant when combined with these 
variables and are thus excluded (see Table A2 for detailed information).  
For the individual-level controls, the findings suggest that individuals with a preference for the political 
right, women, older respondents and individuals who live in a rural area have a stronger preference for 
restrictive conceptions of nationhood, whereas this preference declines with increasing education, 
residence in a large city and family income. Regarding work status, individuals who are in training have 
the lowest preference for restrictiveness, followed by the reference group of those individuals who work 
for pay, while unemployed, retired individuals, disabled persons and homemakers have a stronger 
preference for restrictive nationhood. As for minority status, respondents who do not belong to a religious 
or ethnic majority as well as respondents with at least one non-citizen parent have, unsurprisingly, lower 
preference for restrictive nationhood. 
Discussion and conclusion 
The aim of our paper was to examine the relationship between political rhetoric surrounding nationhood 
and how the nation is imagined by citizens. In doing so, we departed from much of the previous literature, 
which focused on the identification of the ethnic–civic distinction in mass public opinion (e.g. Jones and 
Smith, 2001a; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010), and instead examined whether preferences for more 
restrictive nationhood resonate with the conceptions put forward in a specific party’s political rhetoric 
and the related political climate in a society. We advanced three hypotheses as to how rhetoric may affect 
individual-level conceptions: through a direct mobilizing effect of the societal political climate generally; 
through elite cues in which individuals’ views are affected only by that party with which they align 
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themselves more generally; and through a combination of both societal climate and norms and party-
specific messages.  
After summarizing the main findings in the previous section, what can be said regarding our three 
hypotheses? Hypothesis 1 stated that individuals in countries with higher levels of ethnic political climate 
tend to define citizenship in more restrictive terms and increasingly favor restrictive conceptions over 
time due to the priming and socializing role of political rhetoric, whereas the opposite should be the case 
in societies with civic political climates. The data supports the second half of our claim: over time, the 
trend towards preferences for restrictive nationhood is lower (or even reversed) in civic political climates. 
However, the data does not support the claim regarding the overall differences between countries, given 
that the main effects of political rhetoric were not significant. This finding departs from that of Helbling 
et al. (2016), the most closely related analysis, which finds that exclusive — or ethnic — rhetoric overlaps 
with heightened expressions of restrictive views of nationhood. One reason for the difference in findings 
may be due to coverage: our analysis covers not only the countries included in the 2003 ISSP survey but 
also those in the 1995 and 2013 waves.  
Hypothesis 2 stated that respondents tend to be more restrictive in their conceptions of nationhood if 
they share the political ideology of parties doing the articulation in ethnic terms and less restrictive if they 
share that of parties supporting a civic conception, as their political opinions are particularly influenced 
by cues provided by trusted elites. Our data clearly shows the significant impact of the preferred party’s 
rhetoric, with ethnic rhetoric having a positive impact on preferences for restrictive nationhood, and civic 
rhetoric having a negative impact. Hypothesis 2 is thus confirmed, which suggests that elite cues affect 
not only general policy issues (e.g. Lupia, 1994; Zaller, 1992) but also national identity more generally (e.g. 
Bohmann, 2011; McLaren, 2001). Alternatively, respondents could align themselves with those parties 
with whose conceptions of nationhood they identify, but we would argue that party choice is unlikely to 
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be driven by this issue alone in countries that are not deeply divided along ethnic lines, such as those 
considered in this paper.  
Finally, hypothesis 3 added that in political climates that are generally low in ethnic rhetoric, only people 
affiliated with parties that stress ethnic rhetoric would prefer restrictive nationhood, whereas in generally 
high ethnic climates, almost all individuals (also those affiliated with parties that do not stress ethnic 
rhetoric) may show stronger preferences for restrictive nationhood due to conservative norm setting. 
Considering the interaction effects, which show only small differences in societies with high ethnic climate 
and large differences in societies with low ethnic climate (see Figure 2), this hypothesis is also supported. 
The findings align with those of a limited number of prior studies on the link between wider social norms 
and anti-immigrant attitudes (e.g. Sniderman et al., 2004; van Assche et al., 2016), thus indicating the 
importance of considering social norms in analyses of ethnic relations more generally. 
Overall, the empirical findings support our idea that political rhetoric influences respondents’ preferences 
for more restrictive conceptions of nationhood. The constructivist view that symbolic boundaries are 
constantly renegotiated (e.g. Chandra, 2012) seems to apply in our case, as political rhetoric does have 
“constructivist power.” Its effects, however, are not as straightforward as initially expected. While the 
societal political climate of party positions does not have a direct overall effect, the models suggest 
indirect effects such as different trends in preferences for restrictive nationhood depending on the level 
of societal civic climate and the way in which a specific party’s rhetoric affects the attitudes of their 
individual recipients. As for the latter, ethnic rhetoric causes larger differences in societies that are 
characterized by low overall ethnic climate. 
This effect can be interpreted in two ways. First, in line with the idea of political party rhetoric influencing 
attitudes — by acting as primers and norm-setters, as outlined in our hypotheses — we can conclude that 
parties emphasizing ethnic issues can shape attitudes toward nationhood. Second, one can argue that 
20 
ethnocentric voters are attracted to ethnocentric parties. However, considering Figure 2, such a law of 
attraction applies only in societies in which ethnic rhetoric is rather scarce (far-left graph in Fig. 2). Once 
ethnic rhetoric is more present, even respondents who prefer parties that do not stress ethnic issues hold 
more restrictive views of nationhood (far-right graph in Fig. 2). Such an overall shift goes well with the 
recent political developments in Europe and other countries and may explain why there is little resistance 
to right-wing politics in contemporary Europe. Once many parties stress ethnic conceptions of 
nationhood, even more liberal voters hold strong preferences for restrictive nationhood. 
These interpretations assume that the causal arrow runs from political rhetoric to mass opinion, rather 
than vice versa. This assumption is supported by the aforementioned literature on elites as cue-givers and 
voters as cue-takers. In addition, our approach to the data sought to consider causality by measuring 
rhetoric advanced during the elections that were held prior to when the survey data was collected and by 
explicitly including changes over time into our models. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the possibility that 
political elites may adapt their rhetoric to appeal to a pre-existing constituency or that party and mass 
conceptions may develop conjointly. Future research may examine the direction of causality in more 
depth by using long-running longitudinal studies, for example. 
Apart from our main goal, considering several control variables also led to valuable insights. First, at the 
macro-level, indicators of material factors such as economic prosperity and post-communist legacy were 
more important than the level of immigration, thus suggesting that “threat” by increasing immigration 
alone does not result in more preference for restrictive and closed definitions of societies. At the micro-
level, the control variables showed that migration background and minority status result in lower 
preference for restrictive nationhood, and this effect also holds true for higher social status and better 
economic circumstances. In addition, educated respondents, younger individuals and urban (compared 
to rural) dwellers express less preference for restrictive nationhood, whereas conservative political views 
further foster such preferences. Future research may be particularly interested in the way in which 
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education mitigates political rhetoric, as it was this individual-level factor that rendered other findings in 
previous models insignificant. 
 
Notes 
1 Other studies have termed this latent concept “preference for ascriptive features,” “ethnic” dimension 
of nationhood, and “ascribed/objective” dimension (see data and methods section for more detail). 
2 Though note that, in the long term, immigration may also increase tolerance and trust (Gundelach, 2014; 
Putnam, 2007) and hence lead to less restrictive conceptions. 
3 A reviewer pointed out that countries such as Belgium, Spain and Great Britain could be split into smaller 
units as well due to strong regional identities and groups. We agree with the reviewer but refrained from 
doing so, as it was impossible to have a clear division between homogenous and heterogeneous societies, 
and we did not develop any specific hypotheses in this regard. 
4 Respondents are included if they have at least one valid answer across these three items. This procedure 
limits the loss of respondents due to missing cases in the dependent variable to 1359 cases (instead of 
7307 cases in a list-wise deletion when considering the total sample.) Considerable numbers of missing 
cases in the independent individual-level variables, on the other hand, are treated as embedded variables. 
This embedded variable procedure ((Hardy and Reynolds, 2004) results in two regression coefficients: the 
first one indicates the effect of the variable of interest (e.g. income) on the dependent variable, and the 
second one indicates the difference between respondents (e.g. income reported) and non-respondents 
(e.g. income not reported) with regard to the dependent variable. Thus, we could gauge the effects of the 
independent variable and the difference between respondents and non-respondents. 
5 In contrast to Helbling and colleagues (2013; 2016), we do not include the following categories into civic 
rhetoric because these, although directly opposite to the categories mentioned for ethnic rhetoric, in our 
view do not signify civic rhetoric: “unfavourable mentions of the manifesto country’s nation and history” 
(national way of life: negative, 602) and “opposition to traditional and/or religious moral values” 
(traditional morality: negative, 604). Note that the individual indices are only correlated at 0.3 and have 
different effects, wherefore we decided to use the separate indices.  
6 We also calculated weighted indices based on the party’s strength in the election. These weighted 
measures resulted in similar outcomes and thus were not reported (detailed codes and variables can be 
requested from the authors).  
7 We also considered more formal ties in the form of International Governmental Organizations, which 
are established by international treaties and agreements between governments. The number of IGOs, 
however, is not significant and thus not reported in this paper. 
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Table 1a. Preference for restrictive nationhood (countries ranked according to latest available wave) 
 1995 2003 2013 
    
South Africa (ZA)   3.56 
Turkey (TR)   3.44 
Russia (RU)  3.21 3.35 
Bulgaria (BG) 3.30   
Georgia (GE)   3.29 
Poland (PL) 2.85 3.24  
Mexico (MX)   3.20 
Slovak Republic (SK) 2.68 2.71 3.11 
Austria (AT) 2.98 3.02  
Hungary (HU) 2.72 2.82 2.99 
Canada (CA) 2.34 2.97  
Italy (I) 2.96   
South Korea (KR)  2.90 2.94 
Ireland (IE) 3.21 3.15 2.91 
Czech Republic (CZ) 2.63 2.80 2.91 
Belgium (BE)   2.91 
Lithuania (LT)   2.90 
United States (US) 2.94 3.22 2.83 
Israel (IL)  3.13  
Great Britain (GB) 2.88 2.83 2.83 
Spain (ES) 2.97 2.92 2.81 
Croatia (HR)   2.81 
New Zealand (NZ) 2.67 2.77  
Latvia (LV)  2.70 2.75 
Japan (JP) 2.84 2.92 2.73 
Australia (AU) 2.53 2.73  
Portugal (PT)  3.09 2.71 
Switzerland (CH)  2.58  
Norway (NO) 2.62 2.60  
Germany-West (DE-W) 2.48 2.62 2.58 
Denmark (DK)  2.75 2.54 
Iceland (IS)   2.50 
France (FR)  2.45 2.49 
Finland (FI)  2.60 2.47 
Germany-East (DE-E) 2.53 2.43 2.46 
Slovenia (SI) 2.82 2.68 2.45 
Estonia (EE)   2.33 
Netherlands (NL) 2.24   
Sweden (SE) 2.35 2.26 2.11 
    
Source: ISSP 1995, 2003 and 2013. Country mean values of scale based on items being in the country, 
having lived there almost the entire life and belonging to a certain denomination. Unweighted data. 
Limited to countries and time points where individual party preferences and pre-survey wave manifesto 
data are available. N=58,498. 
Table 1b. Changes in preferences for restrictive nationhood  
 Increase   Decrease 
     
Canada (CA) .63  Norway (NO) -.02 
Slovak Republic (SK) .43  Great Britain (GB) -.05 
Poland (PL) .39  Germany-East (DE-E) -.07 
Czech Republic (CZ) .28  United States (US) -.11 
Hungary (HU) .27  Japan (JP) -.11 
Australia (AU) .20  Finland (FI) -.13 
Russia (RU) .14  Spain (ES) -.16 
New Zealand (NZ) .10  Denmark (DK) -.21 
Germany-West (DE-W) .10  Sweden (SE) -.24 
Latvia (LV) .05  Ireland (IE) -.30 
Austria (AT) .04  Slovenia (SI) -.37 
South Korea (KR) .04  Portugal (PT) -.38 
France (FR) .04    
     
 
Based on the difference between the most recent and the earliest data available for each country, as 
shown in Table 1a. Source: ISSP 1995, 2003 and 2013.  
  

















         
Constant 2.78 ** 2.85 ** 2.9 ** 6.33 ** 
Wave  .164 + .148 + .148 + .155 * 
         
Individual level         
  Preferred party’s civic rhetoric   -.009 ** -.022 ** -.008 ** 
  Preferred party’s ethnic rhetoric   .017 ** .023 ** .009 ** 
         
  Party affiliation (left-right)       .048 ** 
         
  Female       .025 ** 
  Age (years)       .006 ** 
  Education (years)       -.034 ** 
  Residence (small city = ref)         
    Large city       -.016 * 
    Rural area       .045 ** 
  Household income (low–high)       -.060 ** 
         
  Ethnic minority       -.027 ** 
  Religious minority       -.246 ** 
  Parent(s) non-citizen       -.254 ** 
         
 Work Status (for pay=ref)         
    Unemployed       .029 * 
    In training       -.051 ** 
    Retired       .076 ** 
    Disabled       .093 ** 
    Homemaker       .053 ** 
    Other       .008  
         
Societal level         
  Political climate - civic .007  .004  -.007  -.000  
  Political climate - ethnic -.010  -.024  -.017  .010  
         
  GDP       -.352 ** 
  Post-communist society       -.190 ** 
         
Crosslevel interactions         
  Soc. Pol. Cli. Civic * Time -.026 * -.023 * -.022 *a) -.015  
  Soc. Pol. Cli. Ethnic * Time .012  .010  .010  .001  
         
  Soc. Pol. Cli. Civic*Pref Party - Civic     .001 ** .000  
  Soc. Pol. Cli. Civic*Pref Party - Ethnic     .001 ** .001 ** 
         
  Soc. Pol. Cli. Ethnic*Pref Party - Civic     -.000  .000  
  Soc. Pol. Cli. Ethnic*Pref Party - Ethnic     -.002 ** -.001 **b) 
         
-2loglikelihod value 126,003 125,180 125,025 116,876 
^ Linear hierarchical regression; 3 levels with 39 country and 77 wave-country observations, and 55,769 
respondents. The difference to the total sample of 58,498 occurs due to missing cases in some independent 
variables. RIGLS estimation with robust sandwich estimators. Also included but not shown in Table 2: embedded 
variables for missing answers in income, residence and ethnicity. Unstandardized coefficients, ** p = .01, * p=.05, 
+p = .01, interactions a) and b) are depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively.  
Figure 1.  Changes in preferences for restrictive nationhood over time in societies with different 
degrees of civic political climate (interaction a, Table 2) 
 
 
Figure 2.  Effects of preferred party’s ethnic rhetoric in societies with different degrees of ethnic 




Table A1. Overview of country-level characteristics* 











1995 1 Australia (AU) 21035 22.9 1851 5 5.2 2.6 
 2 Germany-West (DE-W) 23066 9.1 2974 0 1.9 5.8 
 3 Germany-East (DE-E) 23066 9.1 2974 0 1.9 5.8 
 4 Great Britain (GB) 21032 7.2 2846 2.5 3.4 4.8 
 6 United States (US) 28782 10.7 2273 3 8.11 7.71 
 7 Austria (AT) 23688 11.2 2243 0 2.4 12.2 
 8 Hungary (HU) 9098 3.1 1617  3.5 4.9 
 9 Italy (I) 21934 3.1 2791 0 3.6 7.1 
 10 Ireland (IE) 18386 6.2 1637 1 2.7 10.1 
 11 Netherlands (NL) 22856 8.7 2741 2.5 1.2 5.4 
 12 Norway (NO) 23565 5.4 2248 0 6.2 6.9 
 13 Sweden (SE) 22734 10.6 2545 3 2.9 17.9 
 14 Czech Republic (CZ) 13795 1.6 609  3.8 8.3 
 15 Slovenia (SI) 13217 8.8 528  4.4 6.8 
 16 Poland (PL) 7432 2.5 1626  0.3 2.8 
 17 Bulgaria (BG) 5543 0.4 1009  1.4 8.1 
 19 New Zealand (NZ) 17748 16.0 1274 2.5 1.7 7.9 
 20 Canada (CA) 23192 16.6 2043 5 4.9 6.1 
 24 Japan (JP) 22945 1.1 1863 0 0.0 1.9 
 25 Spain (ES) 16405 2.6 2626 0 0.8 4.5 
 27 Slovak Republic (SK) 8463 1.3 462  3.9 9.9 
2003 1 Australia (AU) 29781 23.0 6167 8 11.8 11.4 
 2 Germany-West (DE-W) 29285 11.0 10207 2 3.7 9.6 
 3 Germany-East (DE-E) 29285 11.0 10207 2 3.7 9.6 
 4 Great Britain (GB) 31152 8.0 10139 5.5 3.2 6.8 
 6 United States (US) 39677 12.3 8640 3 6.69 4.07 
 7 Austria (AT) 32161 12.4 6688 1 1.1 7.4 
 8 Hungary (HU) 15573 2.9 4925  6.2 6.1 
 10 Ireland (IE) 35745 9.1 5431 1.5 0.3 9.9 
 12 Norway (NO) 38287 6.5 6427 0 2.3 6.6 
 13 Sweden (SE) 32024 11.3 7827 5 3.1 9.7 
 14 Czech Republic (CZ) 19584 2.2 4512  7.2 3.6 
 15 Slovenia (SI) 20919 8.6 2805  4.3 10.3 
 16 Poland (PL) 12030 2.1 5225  4.7 2.3 
 18 Russia (RU) 9254 8.1 4463  5.4 7.4 
 19 New Zealand (NZ) 23717 17.6 4034 5 8.6 6.4 
 20 Canada (CA) 32032 18.0 7073 7.5 1.1 4.1 
 22 Israel (IL) 22268 30.8 4284  17.13 17.01 
 24 Japan (JP) 27944 1.3 5756 0 1.02 6.07 
 25 Spain (ES) 25305 4.1 8483 1 0.6 7.4 
 26 Latvia (LV) 10812 18.1 1867  5.4 6.2 
 27 Slovak Republic (SK) 13912 2.2 2840  4.3 3.2 
 28 France (FR) 28058 10.6 10653 2 4.6 10.6 
 30 Portugal (PT) 19798 6.3 5908 2 2.2 7.4 
 32 Denmark (DK) 31229 7.0 7263 0.5 14.1 10.6 
 33 Switzerland (CH) 36372 21.9 7808 1 15.2 10.9 
 37 Finland (FI) 28779 2.6 6652 1.5 4.4 5.5 
 42 South Korea (KR) 21340 0.5 3233  0.6 3.4 
2013 2 Germany-West (DE-W) 44469 14.4 11386 2.5 3.1 11.3 
 3 Germany-East (DE-E) 44469 14.4 11386 2.5 3.1 11.3 
 4 Great Britain (GB) 38452 12.1 11213 5.5 5.5 3.3 
 6 United States (US) 53041 14.3 9520 3 7.3 6.1 
 8 Hungary (HU) 23482 4.4 5707  5.1 10.4 
 10 Ireland (IE) 46140 15.8 5955 3 1.1 3.9 
 13 Sweden (SE) 45148 14.8 8616 7 4.7 11.6 
 14 Czech Republic (CZ) 28224 3.8 5305  2.4 4.9 
 15 Slovenia (SI) 28996 12.4 3561  2.0 6.3 
 18 Russia (RU) 24114 7.8 5187  11.7 8.1 
 24 Japan (JP) 36450 1.7 6260 0 1.07 5.78 
 25 Spain (ES) 32925 13.5 9602 3.5 0.4 8.3 
 26 Latvia (LV) 22560 15.0 2522  14.32 8.61 
 27 Slovak Republic (SK) 26642 2.7 3488  4.0 8.4 
 28 France (FR) 37872 11.4 11754 2 3.3 6.4 
 30 Portugal (PT) 26759 7.2 6587 3.5 0.1 6.5 
 32 Denmark (DK) 43445 9.2 7925 0 5.9 9.4 
 37 Finland (FI) 39812 4.6 7327 6 4.9 11.2 
 40 South Africa (ZA) 3959 3.8 4788  5.1 8.7 
 42 South Korea (KR) 33140 1.9 3866  0.1 4.3 
 44 Croatia (HR) 21366 13.3 3362  1.3 7.4 
 45 Estonia (EE) 25452 16.4 2836  7.7 6.2 
 46 Georgia (GE) 7176 4.3 1287  3.3 6.6 
 47 Iceland (IS) 41939 11.0 2681  0.9 14.8 
 49 Lithuania (LT) 25467 5.1 2772  5.8 6.3 
 50 Mexico (MX) 16463 0.8 4981  0.3 3.3 
 51 Turkey (TR) 19020 1.9 4282  2.1 4.7 
 52 Belgium (BE) 41663 9.6 9718 5.5 3.0 8.3 
*blank cells indicate missing data; for sources and coding see data and methods section 
  
Table A2. Testing the effect of macro-level variables, when entered singly in addition to micro-level 
variables 
Model Variable Level of Effect -2LL value 
  Country Wave  
     
1 Micro-level model   116,872 
     
2 Wave-1) Random variance: 012+ .067** 116,862 
     
3 GDP-2) -.271** .116* 116,853 
     
4 Post-communist society-3) .037 -- 116,872 
     
5 Immigrants (%) -.011+ .003 116,869 
     
6 INGO-4) -.126 .034* 116,865 









     
8 Societal political climate - ethnic -.002 -.001 116,872 
     
9 Societal political climate - civic-6) -.021 .003 116,870 
     
     
     
Each model includes the named macro-level variable plus all micro-level variables presented in Table 2 
(that is Model 4 in Table 2 minus the societal variables and interactions). Linear hierarchal regression, 3 
levels with 39 country observations, 77 wave-country observations, and 55769 respondents, RIGLS 
estimation with robust sandwich estimators. Unstandardized coefficients, ** p = .01, * p=.05, +p = .01 
 
1 The wave effect was allowed to vary across countries. The slope variance is significant at .1 level. 
There is no significant covariation between the slope and the intercept variance. 
2 Including an interaction between GDP (country) and GDP (wave) is significant and renders the 
variance of the wave slope insignificant. 
3 The variable post-communism does not vary over time. In order to test for different trajectories, 
an interaction between wave and post-communism was tested. Neither the main effects nor the 
interaction turned out to be significant. Post-communism, however, becomes significant when 
combined with other macro-variables. 
4 The over-time effect of INGO loses its significance when the wave variable is included. 
5 This index was available only for a small subset of our countries. An interaction for missing cases 
was thus included. See endnote 4, methods section, on embedded variables. The low -2LL value 
is driven by the additional embedded variable and does not indicate a substantive effect of 
multiculturalism. 
6 Including the wave variable results in a significance of p=.1 of the civic dimension at country 
level. 
